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We discuss the formation of technical standards platforms in industries with network 
externalities where firms are free to choose their degree of technical compatibility with 
competitors.  In our model, firms choose affiliation to a technical standards coalition in 
the first stage of a game, and play an oligopoly game in the second stage.  In adding itself 
to a technical standards coalition, a firm benefits from the network effects of the whole 
coalition, but also faces increased competition in the output market from other firms in 
the coalition. Also, the increase of the size of the coalition changes the competitive 
position of members of that coalition relative to other firms.  We find that the extent and 
size of coalitions at equilibrium depends crucially on the degree of the intensity of 
network effects.  When network effects are very strong, full compatibility prevails.  
When externalities are slightly weaker, two standards coalitions are formed, a singleton, 
and one with all remaining firms.  On the other extreme, for very weak network effects, 
the equilibrium is total incompatibility, and for slightly more intense network effects, 
coalitions are of small size.  We characterize a number of other equilibria for 
intermediate strengths of network externalities. 
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Standards Coalitions Formation and Market Structure  
in Network Industries 
 
1. Introduction 
The issue of choice of technical compatibility standards is the key to 
understanding strategic choices in network industries and the resulting equilibrium 
market structure.  This paper establishes the choice of technical standards and the 
formation of technical standards associations in network industries. 
The existence of network effects implies that the value of a good increases with 
the size of the sales of technically compatible products.  A firm’s adherence to the same 
technical standard (same platform) with other firms allows the firm to receive the 
network effects benefits of the total production of all firms in the same platform.  At the 
same time, competition among firms in the same platform is expected to be more intense 
since their products are less differentiated.  These two opposing incentives determine the 
direct benefits and costs to a firm of affiliation with other firms on the same technical 
standard.  There are also indirect costs and benefits that come from the effects on the 
oligopoly outcome of the formation or expansion of technical standards associations.  For 
example, one expects that the expansion of a standards association will diminish profits 
of firms outside it. 
We model firms’ choices as a two-stage game.  In the first stage, firms choose 
whether to affiliate with other firms so as to share a technical standard (platform).  The 
result of the first stage game is a partition of the set of firms into associations (coalitions), 
where the same technical standard prevails within each coalition, and different standards 
prevail across coalitions.  The oligopoly of the second stage is specified so that 
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competition is more intense among firms in the same coalition and less intense between 
firms that belong to different coalitions.  It is also assumed that an increase in the size of 
a coalition is beneficial to all its members and detrimental to non-members.  Finally, it is 
assumed that firms’ profits decrease as firms become more concentrated in terms of 
compatibility. 
We set the coalition formation (first) stage of the game following the models of 
Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999) and Bloch (1996, 1997).  Firms are assigned an index and 
make sequential proposals starting with the firm of the smallest index.  Firm 1 makes a 
proposal to specific firms to include them it its coalition.  The offer consists of  the set of 
firms that are invited to form a coalition and conditional statements that describe the 
division of the coalition’s worth conditional on the final coalition structure of the 
industry.  Firms respond in sequence.  If all recipients of the proposal accept it, the 
specific coalition is formed, its members exit the game, and the next lowest index firm 
announces the next proposal.  If one firm rejects the original offer, then this firm initiates 
a new proposal.  We focus our attention on stationary equilibria of this game, i.e., 
equilibria in which the strategies depend only on payoff-relevant elements of the game: 
the coalitions that have already exited the game and the set of firms that still remain in 
the game.  Following Ray and Vohra (1999) this game always has a stationary 
equilibrium where the only source of mixing is in the (possibly) probabilistic choice of a 
coalition by each proposer.  These are the equilibria we characterize in this paper.1   
The intensity of network effects plays a crucial role in the structure of 
equilibrium.  For very weak network effects, the equilibrium is total incompatibility, 
                                                 
1  The Bloch (1996) model assumes that the coalition worth is divided according to a fixed rule. The 
equilibrium coalition structures that we study are the same in both scenarios. We come back to this issue in 
section 2.2. 
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where each firm has its own technical standard.  A striking feature of the equilibrium is 
that, except for the total incompatibility case, it is characterized by very significant 
inequalities among the sizes of coalitions.  That is, unless network externalities are very 
weak, the equilibrium does not have equal sizes coalitions at equilibrium.  For very 
strong network effects, the equilibrium is full compatibility, with all firms sharing the 
same technical standard.  For weaker network effects, one firm defects, and for even 
weaker, a second firm joins it in defection.  Finally, for large number of firms and for 
intermediate levels of network effects, the game has no equilibria in pure strategies 
without delay. 
 
2. Formation Of Standards With Cash Transfers 
2.1 General Setup 
Let an industry have N ex-ante homogenous firms.  Before playing an oligopoly 
production game with other firms, each firm chooses a technical standard (platform).  
Each firm can only choose one such platform.  All firms that choose the same platform 
receive the total network benefits of this platform.  Formally, we will consider all firms 
that choose the same platform as belonging to the same coalition.   
Denote by  C  the set of all possible partitions of  N.  For a coalition structure  C ∈ 
C, denote by  K(C)  the number of standards (coalitions) in this structure.  Denote by  nk  
the number of firms in structure  k  for  k = {1, ..., K(C)}.  Let  sk = nk/N.  Finally let  sk(i) 
to be the market share (in terms of number of firms) of the coalition containing firm i. 
We introduce the concept of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the coalition 
structure HH(C), defined as 
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This index measures market concentration of platforms (coalitions).  Note that this is not 
the standard definition of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (“HHI”) of market 
concentration.  It differs in two respects.  First, it defines concentration among platforms 
(coalitions) rather than concentration among firms.  Second, because we do not have 
output data, the index is defined in terms of firms rather than in terms of firms’ outputs.  
But the index HH(C) is similar to the traditional HHI in the sense that it ranges between 
zero and one, and it increases as the market gets more concentrated (here in terms of 
platforms).  The more firms adhere to the same technical standard (belong to the same 
coalition), the higher is the value of HH(C).  Also, HH(C) decreases as the sizes of the 
platforms (coalitions) come closer to equality.2 
The firms play a two-stage game.  In the first stage, firms decide what coalitions 
to form (and how to divide their profits): firms that are in one coalition adopt one 
common standard, but firms in different coalitions have incompatible standards.  During 
the second stage firms compete in the market given the coalition structure.   
 There are three important factors that influence the outcome of the second stage.  
The first is the existence of network effects: those platforms with a larger number of 
firms are more valued by customers.  The second factor that influences the equilibrium is 
competition among firms within the same standard.  The third factor is the degree of 
competition across standards.  We expect that competition among firms that adhere to 
different standards will be less fierce than competition among firms that adhere to the 
                                                 
2  HH(C) also exhibits the other usual properties of HHI.  For example, the combination (merger) of 
two coalitions of sizes  si  and  sj  into a coalition of a single technical standard increases HH(C)  by  2sisj. 
 5
same standard.  Firms in the same coalition are not differentiated by the compatibility 
standard and hence we assume that they compete more strongly than two firms in 
different coalitions.  In general, the interaction between these three factors and their 
impact on the profits can be very complicated, and there are many ways that it can be 
modeled.   
We propose the following simplified reduced form of profits for a given coalition 
structure.  We believe that this form captures the main features described above.  
Specifically, let the gross profits (gross of transfer payments) of firm  i  in coalition 
structure  C  be strictly positive and a strictly increasing linear function3 of 
)()1()()( CHHisCV ki ααβ −−+= ,    (2) 
where  HH(C)  is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the coalition structure as defined 
above, β > 0, and  α, 1 > α  > 0,  measures the relative strength of the network effect 
compared with the competition effects.4  The higher the value of α, the higher the 
influence on profits of the size of the coalition in which the firm belongs and the smaller 
the influence of the overall market conditions summarized by HH(C).  In one extreme, 
when  α = 1, all that matters to profits is the size of the coalition it belongs to.  In the 
other extreme, the size of the own coalition does not matter at all except to the extent it 
influences the market index  HH(C). 
This profit function is a reduced form of the oligopoly outcome of the second 
stage of the game and has the following three properties.  First, for any coalition 
                                                 
3  The linearity of profits in V(C) is necessary for the analysis of transfers between firms, so that the 
total surplus of the coalition a function of the sum of Vi(C) for firms belonging to this coalition. In case the 
firms do not use transfers and divide the surplus equally, the linearity assumption is not necessary. 
 
4 Instead of  α  and  1 - α, we could have alternatively used weights  b > 0 and  c > 0, and then 
normalized by dividing by  (b + c) and defining  α  as  α = b/(b + c). 
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structure, firms in a larger coalition earn higher profits than firms in a smaller coalition, 
that is, Vi(C)  is an increasing function of  sk(i).  This is an immediate consequence of the 
network effect.  More firms in the same coalition result in a higher network effect and 
this implies higher profits.   
Second, profits of firm  i  in platform  k  are a decreasing function of the degree of  
concentration among the competing standards as summarized by  HH(C).  For example, 
the adoption of a common standard by two coalitions that originally had different 
technical standards increases  HH(C)  and therefore decreases profits of all firms which 
do not adhere to this common technical standard. 
 Third, a coalition considering adding one additional firm faces the following 
trade-off: adding it is beneficial because it increases the network effect, but is detrimental 
because it directly increases concentration.  At the same time there is an indirect effect 
because increasing  sk  may change the choices of coalition affiliations of the remaining 
firms. 
 
2.2 Coalition Formation 
 We model the first stage of the game as in Ray and Vohra (1999).  The formation 
of coalitions on technical platforms is modeled as an alternating-offers bargaining game, 
Γ(δ), where  δ  is the discount rate to be explained below.5  Firms are assigned an 
arbitrary index (a protocol of the bargaining game).  Firm number 1 proposes the creation 
of an association (coalition)  S  which includes itself and possibly some other members 
that will share the same technical standard.  Along with the coalition, the proposer 
                                                 
5 See Rubinstein (1982). 
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announces a feasible division of the worth of the association conditional on the final 
coalition structures. Prospective association members respond in sequence to the 
proposal.  If all prospective association members accept the offer, then the coalition is 
formed, and the procedure starts again among the remaining firms, initiated by the firm of 
the lowest index among them.  If all prospective association members do not accept the 
offer, then the first firm that rejected the proposal makes the next proposal of a coalition 
that includes itself.  In addition, a rejection creates a delay in the bargaining and imposes 
a geometric cost on all players that is captured by a common discount factor  δ ∈ (0, 1).  
The procedure continues until an equilibrium in reached.  The payoffs of the firms in the 
final coalition structure are given by equation (2), the contract specifying the division of 
surplus and the number of times a proposal was rejected.  If no agreement is ever 
reached, all players receive zero payoffs.6 
 For example, if there are three firms, firm 1 may propose the formation of one of 
the following coalitions: {1}, {1, 2}, or {1, 2, 3}.  If it proposes {1, 2, 3} and firm 2 
rejects the offer, firm 2 will have to make a proposal of its own.  If firm 2 accepts the 
offer and firm 3 rejects it, firm 3 has to make a proposal of its own.  If both 2 and 3 
accept, the {1, 2, 3} coalition is formed.  If firm 1 proposes {1, 2}, firm 2 may reject it 
and then make its own proposal.  Alternatively, if firm 2 accepts the offer, firm 3 does not 
have a choice in the matter and the coalition structure {{1, 2}, {3}} is formed. 
 In this setup, firms make their decisions anticipating the subsequent decisions of 
other firms in forming coalitions.  Thus, each firm explicitly takes into account the effect 
                                                 
6  Recall that the payoffs given any coalition structure a strictly positive and strictly increasing linear 
function of  Vi (C), so that any agreement strictly dominates infinite disagreement. 
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of its actions in either proposing or accepting an offer on the incentives of other firms to 
form coalitions.  
 
2.3 Existence And Uniqueness Of Stationary Equilibria   
In this game we focus our attention on stationary strategies, i.e. strategies that 
depend only on payoff-relevant components of the game: the structure of the coalitions 
that have already formed and on the set of players that are still in the game.  We define a 
stationary (perfect) equilibrium as a collection of stationary strategies such that there is 
no history at which a player benefits from a deviation from her prescribed strategy.  Ray 
and Vohra (1999) show in their Theorem 2.1:   
There exists a stationary equilibrium of the game  Γ  where the only source of 
mixing is in the (possibly) probabilistic choice of a coalition by each proposer.7 
From now on, we focus only on stationary equilibria of this game.  Bloch (1996) 
and Ray and Vohra (1999) propose a simple algorithm for finding candidate equilibria.  
We follow the description of Bloch (1996).  Define a game  ∆  of choice of coalition 
structures as follows.  Player 1 starts the game and chooses an integer  n1 ∈ {1, …, N}.  If  
n1 = N, the game ends.  Otherwise, player  n1 + 1 chooses an integer  n2 ∈ {1, …, N - n1}, 
and so on, until the sum of integers chosen by players equals  N.  The payoffs are given 
by equation (2) and the coalition structure corresponding to the integers chosen by the 
players.  Game  ∆  is a finite extensive form game with perfect information, so it always 
has a SPNE, which is generically unique.  Adding an assumption that players indifferent 
                                                 
7  Ray and Vohra (1999), p. 294. 
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over several integers always choose the largest one, we obtain uniqueness in the non-
generic cases.  We call  C*  the unique equilibrium coalition structure of  ∆.   
We define a no-delay equilibrium (of the game Γ(δ)) to be one in which, at every 
stage, every proposal that is made is accepted.  The unique equilibrium coalition structure  
C*  of   ∆  in many cases corresponds to a no-delay equilibrium coalition structures of the 
game Γ(δ).  In particular, Theorem 3.1 in Ray and Vohra (1999) states:   
There exists a  δ*∈ (0, 1) such that for all  δ ∈ (δ*, 1), any stationary equilibrium 
of game  Γ(δ)  in which an acceptable proposal is made with positive probability at any 
stage must induce a coalition structure that is identical to  C* up to a permutation of 
firms. 8 
Thus, this theorem states that all equilibria with no-delay have to induce the 
equilibrium coalition structure  C*.  So the question is, under what conditions does the 
game  Γ(δ)   have such equilibria?  This is an open question, but Ray and Vohra offer a 
partial answer.  We paraphrase Theorem 3.2 Ray and Vohra (1999):   
If the payoffs of the firms in game ∆ are weakly decreasing in a firm’s index, then 
there exists such that for all  there exists a stationary equilibrium of 
game  Γ(δ)  in which an acceptable proposal is made in every stage with probability 1.
)1,0(ˆ∈δ )1,ˆ(δδ ∈
9 
Moreover, weakly decreasing payoffs in a firm’s index in game  ∆  is a necessary 
condition for existence of pure strategy no-delay equilibria in game Γ(δ)  as Theorem 3.3 
of Ray and Vohra (1999) shows.  Finally, Theorem 3.4 of Ray and Vohra (1999) provides 
                                                 
8  Ray and Vohra (1999), p. 297. 
 
9  Ray and Vohra (1999), p. 299. 
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a technical sufficient condition that guarantees the uniqueness of the no delay 
equilibrium. 
In many cases in the network industries markets that we study, the weak 
monotonicity of the payoffs as well as the technical condition mentioned above are 
satisfied, and the unique equilibrium of game ∆  is also the unique pure strategy no-delay 
equilibrium in game Γ(δ)  for sufficiently large  δ.  However, for some large N (starting 
at N = 14) and for intermediate values of  α  we have found cases that the monotonicity is 
violated.  This implies that there does not exist a pure strategy no-delay equilibrium in the 
game Γ.  It remains an open question if in these cases there exists a no-delay equilibrium 
in mixed strategies (in some cases certainly not – see section 2.10).  And if not, do there 
exist stationary equilibria with strictly positive probability of delay that induce C*?  We 
conjecture that yes, but we do not have a proof. 
Given these results, we now turn to characterizing equilibrium coalition structures 
of the game Γ(δ).  We discuss only the partition of the firms for high discount factors.  
We do not discuss the division of the surplus, because first, the order of firms is arbitrary, 
so we think that the average payoff is a more relevant statistic, and second, as Ray and 
Vohra (1999) show, as δ converges to 1, the division of the surplus converges to equal 
division (Theorem 3.1). 
 
2.4 Full Compatibility 
We characterize the equilibrium coalition structure as the strength of the network 
effect varies.  A priori we expect that, when the network effects are very strong, the 
market will tend towards full compatibility, that is, all firms will choose to be in the same 
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platform.  This is proved in Proposition 1, which shows that the unique equilibrium will 
be full compatibility for sufficiently strong network effects.  Moreover, as the industry 
size increases, stronger and stronger network externalities are required to get full 
compatibility as equilibrium.  The region of full compatibility is seen above the highest 
line in Figure 1. 
All the Propositions, Lemma and Corollaries below have an extra qualification: 
there exists a  δ*∈(0, 1), such that, for all  δ∈(δ*, 1), the propositions are true.  In all the 
proofs, we first study the equilibria of game ∆.  Then, we check that the payoffs are 
weakly decreasing weakly in a firm’s index in game  ∆.  Thus, we extend the results to 
game  Γ(δ)  with δ∈(δ*,1). 
Proposition 1:  The (unique) equilibrium of game  Γ(δ)  with no-delay is full 
compatibility (i.e., C = {N}) if and only if 
)1(2
)1(2
−+
−≥
NN
Nα , and lim N→∝  )1(2
)1(2
−+
−
NN
N  
= 2/3. 
Proof:  We start the proof by analyzing game ∆. We first prove the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 1:  In any subgame of ∆, the first stage game with  n  firms left to be 
divided into coalitions, all  n  remaining firms will form a single coalition if and only if 
)1(2
)1(2
−+
−≥
nN
nα . 
Proof: The proof is by induction.  Take n = 2.  Given the division of firms up to 
this moment, the current firm makes a choice between two coalition structures that assign 
the last two firms as {1, 1} or {2}.  Direct computation shows that the second will chosen 
if and only if 
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That is equivalent to 
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α .      (4) 
So the Lemma is true for  n = 2.  Now suppose it is true for any  n = {2,…, k}.  We now 
show that this implies that it holds for  n = k + 1. 
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Figure 1 
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First, notice that 
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k  is increasing in k.  So if 
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kα  and the 
current firm chooses to propose a coalition of smaller size than  k + 1, the remaining 
firms will form exactly one coalition.  So the firm choosing  xi  for any coalition structure 
established in previous moves, induces a coalition structure {k + 1} or {xi, (k + 1 -  xi)}.  
This firm will choose a single coalition if and only if: 

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Call  y = k + 1 - xi  the number of firms that are left by firm i.  Condition (5) is satisfied if 
and only if 
)1(2
)1(2
ykN
yk
−++
−+≥α .     (6) 
The RHS is decreasing in  y.  So, if 
)1(2
)1(2
)(2
)(2
−+
−=+≥ nN
n
kN
kα , the current firm 
chooses xi = k + 1.  If α  is smaller than this cut-off, then even if the remaining firms form 
one coalition, firm 1 prefers some  xi < k + 1  over  k + 1.  Finally, if the firm prefers not 
to form one coalition from remaining firms when it expects the residual firms to form one 
coalition, it does so even more when it expects them to form more then one coalition 
(because this decreases the HH(C) index).  So, for any  
)1(2
)1(2
−+
−<
nN
nα , the firm will 
not choose xi = k + 1.  That finishes the proof of the lemma. 
 Now, by looking at the first subgame of the game ∆  when  n = N, we get full 
compatibility as the unique outcome.  As the payoffs are trivially weakly decreasing for 
high discount factors there exists a no-delay equilibrium of Γ(δ), and it generates full 
compatibility.  Finally, it is straightforward to check that the conditions of Theorem 3.4 
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in Ray and Vohra (1999) are satisfied so the no-delay full compatibility is the unique 
equilibrium outcome of  Γ(δ)  for high discount factors. 
 Also note that as  N  tends to infinity the lower bound of  α  in proposition 1 
increases to 2/3.  Thus, for any industry size, for strong network externalities, α ≥ 2/3, the 
equilibrium is full compatibility. 
 
2.5 Total Incompatibility Equilibria 
On the other extreme, we expect that, when network effects are weak, firms will 
choose mutually incompatible standards since there is less competition among mutually 
incompatible products.  This is proved in Proposition 2, which shows that the unique 
equilibrium will be total incompatibility for sufficiently weak network effects.  The 
region of total incompatibility is seen below the lowest line in Figure 1.  The upper 
boundary of total incompatibility region tends to zero as the size of the industry tends to 
infinity.  This means that, in an industry of a very large number of participants, even very 
small network effects will result in some technical standards coalition formation. 
Proposition 2:  The (unique) equilibrium of game  Γ(δ)  is no-delay total 
incompatibility (i.e., C = {1, 1, …, 1} with  N  elements) if and only if  
2
2
+< Nα , and  
lim N→∝  2
2
+N  = 0. 
Proof:  Start with the game ∆. Again, the proof is by induction.  Take a subgame 
with  n = 2  firms left.  By Lemma 1, the unique outcome is full incompatibility if and 
only if  
2
2
+< Nα .  Now suppose that in any subgame with  n = {1, …, k} the outcome 
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is full incompatibility if and only if 
2
2
+< Nα .  We show that this implies full 
incompatibility in a subgame with  n = k + 1  if and only if  
2
2
+< Nα .  In such a 
subgame, the firm making a proposal knows that when it selects any  x  firms to form a 
coalition with it, the remaining firms will form singleton coalitions (regardless of the 
coalition structure of firms that already formed coalitions).  So this firm will decide to 
form a singleton coalition if and only if: 
2
2
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1)1(1)1(1
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+−+−−>+−− αααα    (7) 
for every  x ∈ {2, …, (k + 1)}.  Equation (7) can be simplified to  
xN
x
+<α , which is 
true for every  x ∈ {2, …, (k + 1)}  if and only if  
2
2
+< Nα .  This finishes the proof for 
any subgame, including the whole game.  Trivially the payoffs are weakly monotonic, so 
there exists a no-delay equilibrium of  Γ(δ).  Also, trivially the condition of Theorem 3.4 
in Ray and Vohra (1999) is  satisfied.  Thus, for high discount factors, this is a unique 
equilibrium outcome of  Γ(δ). 
 
2.6 Partial Compatibility Equilibria; Equilibria Close To Compatibility 
 We now investigate further the structure of the equilibrium for intermediate 
strengths of the network effects, where the equilibrium is neither full compatibility nor 
total incompatibility.  When network externalities are relatively strong, the resulting 
equilibria are close to full compatibility.  Proposition 3 shows that for strong network 
externalities which are slightly weaker that the strength that guarantees full compatibility, 
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the equilibrium will have all but one firms in a large coalition.  As the strength of the 
network externality decreases even more, Proposition 4 shows that the resulting 
equilibrium will have all but two firms in a large coalition, and the remaining two firms 
will form their own coalition.   
Proposition 3:  If N ≥ 4  and  


−+
−
−+
−∈
)1(2
)1(2,
)3(2
)3(2
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Nα then  the unique 
equilibrium coalition structure of game  Γ(δ)  is {N - 1, 1}. 
Proof:  Again we start with the game ∆. First, when 



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Nα , then from Lemma 1 we know that the equilibrium 
coalition structure will not be {N} and for any  x < N  chosen by firm 1, the remaining 
firms will form one coalition.  So the first firm will choose x = N - 1 if and only if: 
2
22
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2 )1()1()1(11)1()1(1
N
yyN
N
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N
N
N
N ++−−−−−−≥+−−−− αααα   (8) 
where  y = N - 1 - x, and  y ∈ {1, …, (N - 2)}.  Condition (8) can be rewritten as: 
)2(2
)2(2
−−+
−−≥
yNN
yNα .     (9) 
The RHS is decreasing in  y  and is at most 
)3(2
)3(2
−+
−
NN
N , so given our restriction on  α 
the outcome is {N - 1, 1}.  Now consider any 


−+
−
−+
−∈
)2(2
)2(2,
)3(2
)3(2
NN
N
NN
Nα .  If  x > 
1, then the remaining  N - 2  firms again form a single coalition.  Given expression (9), 
we know then that the optimal choice from  x ∈ {2,…, N}  is  N - 1.  It remains to 
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compare the profits of firm 1 in coalition structures {1, N - 2, 1} and {N - 1, 1}.  The 
second one is chosen if and only if: 
)3(2
)3(2
2
2
−+
−≥+> NN
N
N
α .   
As the sizes of coalitions are decreasing in the index of the proposing firm, the 
payoffs of the firms in them are decreasing as well.  Thus, for high discount factors, {N - 
1, 1} is a no delay equilibrium coalition structure of  Γ(δ).  Also, the technical sufficient 
condition of Theorem 3.4 of Ray and Vohra is satisfied, what provides uniqueness.  This 
finishes the proof. 
Proposition 4:  If N ≥ 8 and 


−+
−
−+
−∈
)3(2
)3(2,
)5(2
)5(2
NN
N
NN
Nα , then there 
exists a no-delay equilibrium of game Γ(δ) with equilibrium coalition structure  {N - 2, 
2}.  For  N = {6, 7} the same is true for  


−+
−
−+
−∈
)3(2
)3(2,
)4(2
)4(2
NN
N
NN
Nα . 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
2.7 Partial Compatibility Equilibria; Equilibria Close to Incompatibility 
When network effects are weak, coalitions tend to be small since the benefits 
from joining an association are small.  When the strength of the network effects is very 
small, we have seen in Proposition 2 that there is total incompatibility at equilibrium.  For 
immediately higher network effects, Proposition 5 shows that the equilibrium has a 
singleton coalition, a number of coalitions of size two, and, for odd industry size, one 
coalition of size 3.  Thus, we can generally say that coalition sizes are very small for 
weak network externalities. 
 18
Proposition 5:  If  


++∈ 4
4,
2
2
NN
α , then there exists a no-delay equilibrium 
in game Γ(δ) with equilibrium coalition structure  C = {2, S, 1}  for  N ≥ 3  if  N  is odd 
and  C = {3, S, 1}  if  N  is even, where  S  is a vector of 2s with  (N - 3)/2  elements when  
N  is odd and with  (N - 4)/2 elements when  N  is even. 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
2.8 Inequality Of Coalition Sizes At Equilibrium 
One of the key results of our paper is the existence of very significant inequalities 
among the sizes of coalitions at equilibrium for most parameters.  We show below that, 
except for the parameters that lead to total incompatibility, there are very significant 
inequalities among the sizes of coalitions at equilibrium.  Specifically, Proposition 6 
shows that, when there are two coalitions at equilibrium, the smaller coalition is smaller 
that half the size of the larger coalition plus 1.  Corollary A of Proposition 6 shows the 
same inequality between the smallest and the largest coalitions in the case of many 
coalitions.  Corollary B of Proposition 6 shows that there are no coalition structures with 
all coalitions being of equal size except for the coalition structure of total incompatibility, 
that is, there are no equilibrium coalition structures with equal size coalitions size for all  
α ≥ 2/(2 + N) (from Proposition 2). 
Proposition 6 (asymmetry of coalitions at equilibrium):  Consider any  α  such 
that there are exactly two coalitions formed in a no-delay equilibrium of game Γ(δ).  Let 
their sizes be .  It is always true that  n21 nn ≥ 2 < 1 + n1/2.  
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Proof:  First, by Lemma 1 the smaller coalition has to be formed second.  
Otherwise firm 1 should deviate and choose  x1 = n2.  After such a move, the remaining 
firms would still form one coalition and hence firm 1 would be better off.  Second, again 
by Lemma 1, given that the last  n2  firms form one coalition, it has to be the case that 
 
)1(2
)1(2
2
2
−+
−≥
nN
nα .      (10) 
In that case firm 1 knows that if it chooses x1= n1 + 1 instead of  x1 = n1, the remaining 
firms will still form one coalition.  It prefers to choose  n1  if the following condition 
holds 
))1()1()(1(1))(1( 2
2
2
2
11
2
2
2
2
11
N
nn
N
n
N
nn
N
n −++−−+>+−− αααα .  (11) 
This is true if 
 
)1(2
)1(2
21
21
+−+
+−<
nnN
nnα .    (12) 
Conditions (10) and (12) have a non-empty intersection if and only if , i.e., 
n
)1(2 21 −> nn
2 < 1+ n1/2. This finishes the proof. This result also holds for equilibria with delay if 
their coalition structures correspond to the coalition structure of game ∆. 
Corollary A to Proposition 6:  Consider any no-delay equilibrium coalition 
structure of game Γ(δ) with at least 2 coalitions.  Denote the size of the largest coalition 
by  n1  and the size of the smallest coalition by  n2.  It is always true that n2 < 1 + n1/2.  
Proof:  Take the last two coalitions formed and denote their sizes by  y1  and  y2.  
Clearly  y1  ≤  n1  and  y2  ≥ n2.  Reasoning the same way as in Proposition 5 we get  y1 > 
2(y2 - 1).  (This result also holds for equilibria with delay if their coalition structures 
correspond to the coalition structure of game ∆.) 
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Corollary B to Proposition 6:  For any  n > 1, the egalitarian coalition structure  
{n, n, …, n}  is never a no-delay equilibrium of  Γ(δ)  and never a delay equilibrium with 
the equilibrium structure as in game ∆. 
Proof:  From Corollary A to Proposition 6, if {n, n, …, n} is an equilibrium, then 
n < 1 + n/2  which is equivalent to  n < 2. 
 A number of other results are also interesting.  First, for any N<14,10 it is not the 
case that the equilibrium HH(C) index is weakly monotone in α.  For example, for N = 10 
for α=0.37 the equilibrium coalition structure is {6,3,1} and for α=0.4 the equilibrium 
coalition structure is {5,4,1}, and the corresponding HH(C) are 0.46 and 0.42. Second, in 
this range of N it is the case that the equilibrium number of coalitions is weakly 
monotone in α.   
 
2.9 Other Features Of The Equilibria 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the concentration index, the number 
of coalitions, and the ratio of firms in the largest to the second largest coalition as the 
strength of the network externalities varies.  These diagrams were made for N = 13 firms.  
Table 1 shows the corresponding equilibrium coalition structures. 
                                                 
10 In this range we obtain unique stationary no-delay equilibria in pure strategies – for every N and α - see 
section 2.10 - so we can talk about the equilibria in the whole range of α. For other N in general the 
equilibria of the game ∆ do not always correspond to equilibria of the game Γ so we cannot present the full 
comparative statics. 
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 Table 1 
N = 13 
α Equilibrium coalition structure 
0 {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1} 
0.1333 {2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1} 
0.2353 {3, 3, 3, 3, 1} 
0.2778 {5, 4, 3, 1} 
0.3158 {6, 5, 2} 
0.381 {7, 5, 1} 
0.4348 {9, 4} 
0.48 {10, 3} 
0.5517 {11, 2} 
0.6061 {12, 1} 
0.6486 {13} 
 
As α decreases, the equilibrium moves from full compatibility to partial 
incompatibility with one firm splitting off, and then two , as shown in Propositions 1, 3, 
and 5.  The example shows that this pattern continues for lower α, with the smaller 
coalition increasing to three and then four members.  Then, in the three coalitions 
equilibria, the middle size coalition does not change as the largest coalition shrinks and 
the smallest increases. 
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2.10 Example Of Lack Of Existence Of A Pure Strategies No Delay Equilibrium 
We now discuss an example of a case when 
game Γ does not have a pure strategy, no-delay 
equilibrium.  The smallest N for which it happens is N 
= 14.  For N = 14, this is the case for  α ∈ (0.3, 0.3226).  
We fix  α = 0.31.  We first analyze the game  ∆.  First, 
from Lemma 1 we have that, when there are  n ≤ 4 
firms left in any subgame, they will form one coalition.  
Calculating the payoffs for all other  n (the number of 
firms left in the subgame), we show in Table 2 the 
structure in the rest of the game.  Thus, the number of firms per coalition is not 
monotonic in the whole game.  To see why, consider the different possibilities that the 
first firm chooses a coalition of size x,  x ∈ {1, 2, …, 14}, in Table 3. 
Table 2 
n Coalition structure C 
2 {2} 
3 {3} 
4 {4} 
5 {4, 1} 
6 {5, 1} 
7 {5, 2} 
8 {6, 2} 
9 {6, 3} 
10 {5, 4, 1} 
11 {6, 4, 1} 
12 {7, 4, 1} 
13 {6, 5, 2} 
14 {4, 5, 4, 1} 
 
Table 3 
x Remaining 
Firms 
Coalition 
structure C 
V1(C) 
1 13 {1, 6, 5, 2} k-0.2102 
2 12 {2, 7, 4, 1} k-0.20214 
3 11 {3, 6, 4, 1} k-0.15184 
4 10 {4, 5, 4, 1} k-0.11561 
5 9 {5, 6, 3} k-0.13571 
6 8 {6, 6, 2} k-0.13469 
7 7 {7, 5, 2} k-0.11959 
8 6 {8, 5, 1} k-0.13969 
9 5 {9, 4, 1} k-0.14571 
10 4 {10, 4} k-0.18694 
11 3 {11, 3} k-0.21408 
12 2 {12, 2} k-0.25531 
13 1 {13, 1} k-0.31061 
14 0 {14} k-0.38 
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We see that firm 1 obtains the highest value  V1(C)  by selecting  x = 4, and that 
leads to coalition structure {4, 5, 4, 1}.  This means that the firms in the second coalition 
have higher profits than the firms in the first one and hence game Γ (for N = 14 and α = 
0.31) does not have a pure strategies no delay equilibrium.  Notice that the reason we get 
this example is that, if firm 1 chooses x = 4, the remaining firms form 3 coalitions.  
However, any x > 4 results in fewer number of coalitions, what given the network effect 
is weak, decreases profits of firm 1.  We can also show that, in this case, there is also no 
mixed strategy no delay equilibrium.11 
  
3. Concluding Remarks 
We analyze the formation of technical standards coalitions in markets with 
network effects.  We find that the extent and size of coalitions at equilibrium depends 
crucially on the degree of the intensity of network effects.  When network effects are very 
strong, full compatibility prevails.  When externalities are slightly weaker, two standards 
coalitions are formed, a singleton, and one with all remaining firms.  On the other 
extreme, for very weak network effects, the equilibrium is total incompatibility, and for 
                                                 
11  But even a stronger result can be proven: in this case there is also no mixed strategy no-delay 
equilibrium.  First, suppose that such equilibrium exists. Then it must be the case that the equilibrium 
coalition structure is {4, 5, 4, 1}.  Second, the payoff of a player in the coalitions of size 4 is – 0.116, the 
payoff of a player in the coalition of size 5 is –0.093 and the payoff of the singleton player is –0.182.  
Third, there must exist two players  i  and j such that when it is i to make an offer with all 14 players left in 
the game, the probability that player j will end up in the coalition with 5 players is strictly positive and at 
least 5 times the probability that he will end up in the singleton coalition.  This reasoning is through 
averages: on average it is true as there are 5:1 players in those two coalitions.  If this is true for the average, 
the weak inequality has to be true for at least one player. 
 Now consider the strategy of player j. If he moves first, in the no-delay equilibrium he is supposed 
to get payoff –0.116. If he deviates and makes an unacceptable offer to player i, he can expect a payoff at 
least   δ((1 - p)(-0.116) + p((5/6)(-0.093) + (1/6)(-0.182))) = δ((1 - p)(-0.116) + p(-0.108)), where p > 0 is 
the probability that he will end up in either coalition of size 5 or of size 1.  Clearly for any p >  0 there 
exists δ < 1 such that this deviation is profitable. So there does not exist any no-delay equilibrium of game 
Γ(δ) in stationary strategies. 
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slightly more intense network effects, coalitions are of small size.  We characterize a 
number of other equilibria for intermediate strengths of network externalities. 
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5. Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 4:  First we show the result for  N ≥ 6.  Consider any 
subgame with n  firms left and with 


−+
−
−+
−∈
)3(2
)3(2,
)4(2
)4(2
nN
n
nN
nα .  The firm making 
current proposal x can induce one of the following 3 coalition structures of the remaining 
firms: {1, n - 2, 1}, {2, n - 3, 1}, {x, n - x} (we know this using from the previous 
propositions, we also know that  x = n  is not an optimal choice).   
Now, choosing  x= n - 2  dominates  x = 1  if 
0)2(22)2()1(3 2
222
≥−−−+−−−−
N
nn
N
n αα . 
This is the case when 
zN
z
+≥α  where 3
2
−= nz .  So this is the case when 
3
2)4(2 −≥− nn  and is true for all N ≥ n ≥ 5.  Choosing  x = n - 2  dominates  x = 2  if 
01)3(22)2()1(4 2
2222
≥−−−−+−−−−
N
nn
N
n αα . 
This is the case when 
zN
z
+≥α  where 4
)3(2
−
−=
n
nz .  It is satisfied when 
4
)3(2)4(2 −
−≥−
n
nn  and is true for all N ≥ n ≥ 6. 
Choosing  x = n – 2  dominates any  n – 2 ≥ x ≥ 3  if 
0)(2)2()1(2 2
2222
≥−−−+−−−−−
N
xnxn
N
xn αα . 
This is the case when 
zN
z
+≥α , where xn
xnxnz −−
+−+−=
2
8224 2 .  It is satisfied 
when .  For any  x ≤ n – 2, we can show that it is true by showing that zn ≥− )4(2
 28
8224)2)(4(2 2 −+−+−−− xnxnxnn  is minimized for  x = n - 2 (and then z = 2(n - 4)). 
For x = n - 1 the condition is 0)2(21)1()1(1 2
222
<−−−+−−−
N
nn
N
αα   or 
)3(2
)3(2
−+
−<
nN
nα , which is the case.  So we have proved the proposition for  N ≥ 6  and 



−+
−
−+
−∈
)3(2
)3(2,
)4(2
)4(2
NN
N
NN
Nα . 
Now consider 


−+
−
−+
−∈
)4(2
)4(2,
)5(2
)5(2
nN
n
nN
nα and a subgame with  n ≥ 8  firms 
left.  The current choice leads to one of the following coalition structures:  
{1, n - 3 , 2}, {2, n - 3, 1},{3, n - 4,1}, and {x, n - x} for x ≥ 4.  First, clearly, choosing x 
= 2 dominates x = 1.  Second choosing x = n - 2 dominates  x = 2 if, as above, 
zN
z
+≥α  where 4
)3(2
−
−=
n
nz .  It is true when 
4
)3(2)5(2 −
−≥−
n
nn  and is true for all N ≥ 
n ≥ 7.  Third, choosing x = n - 2 dominates x = 3 if 
01)4(32)2()1(5 2
2222
≥−−−−+−−−−
N
nn
N
n αα , 
which is true if 
zN
z
+≥α  where 5
184
−
−=
n
nz .  This is true when 
5
184)5(2 −
−≥−
n
nn  and 
for all  N ≥ n ≥ 8. 
Fourth, choosing x = n  - 2 dominates any  n – 2 ≥ x ≥ 4 if 
0)(2)2()1(2 2
2222
≥−−−+−−−−−
N
xnxn
N
xn αα . 
This is the case when 
zN
z
+≥α , where xn
xnxnz −−
+−+−=
2
8224 2 .  It is satisfied when 
.  For any x ≤ n - 2 we can show that it is true by showing that zn ≥− )5(2
 29
8224)2)(5(2 2 −+−+−−− xnxnxnn   is minimized for  x = n - 2.5.  Checking at  x = n 
- 3  is thus sufficient and indeed  2(n - 5) = z  for this  x.  For x = n - 1 the condition 
remains the same as above and is still satisfied.  This finishes the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 5:  It can be easily verified that given the restriction on  α  
in any subgame with: 
a) n = 2 firms left, the remaining firms form structure {2}; 
b) n = 3 firms left, the remaining firms form structure {2, 1}; 
c) n = 4 firms left, the remaining firms form structure {3, 1}; and 
d) n = 5 firms left, the remaining firms form structure {2, 2, 1}. 
So the Proposition is true for  N = {3, 4}.  Now suppose that, in any subgame with  n = k 
firms, the remaining firms form a coalition structure described above.  We show that it 
implies that it is also the case for  n = k +1. 
 From Proposition 1, we know that, for  N ≥ 3, the equilibrium structure is not full 
compatibility.  When the current firm that makes a proposal picks  x, it leads to a 
coalition structure {x, 3, 2, …, 2, 1} if  (k + 1 – x)  is even and to structure {x, 2, 2, …, 2, 
1}  if  (k + 1 – x)  is odd.  We start by showing that  x = 2  dominates all other even  x,  
and  x = 3  dominates all other odd x.  Any even  x  such that  k - 1 > x > 2  dominates  x 
= 2  if and only if 
0)2)(1(2 2
2
≥−−−−
N
xx
N
x αα . 
That is equivalent to: 
xN
x
+≥α , 
 
which is not the case for any even x  > 2. 
Any odd x  such that  k – 1 > x >1  dominates  x = 1  if and only if: 
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0)1)1(2)(1(1 2
2
≥−−−−−−
N
xx
N
x αα . 
That is equivalent to: 
1
1
−+
−≥
xN
xα , 
and is satisfied only for  x = 3.  So given our restrictions on α, x = 3  dominates all other 
odd  x. 
The remaining possibilities for  x  are {(k - 1), (k)} and they lead to coalition 
structures of the remaining firms: {k - 1, 2} and {k, 1} respectively.  Using similar 
arguments as above it can be shown that in these two special cases  x = 2  again 
dominates any other even x  and x = 3 again dominates any other odd x (in these special 
cases we no longer have to check x = 1). 
The final step is to consider when selecting  x = 2  dominates  x = 3.  When n = k 
+ 1 > 5 is odd then choosing  x = 2  leads to a structure {2, 2, 2, S, 1} and choosing  x = 
3 leads to a structure {3, 3, S, 1}.  The second is chosen if and only if: 
0)4*399)(1(1 2 ≥−+−− NN αα , i.e., 6
6
+≥ Nα , 
which is always true.  Therefore, {2, S, 1} is the equilibrium structure in this subgame. 
When  n = k + 1 > 4  is even then choosing  x = 2  leads to a structure {2, 3, S, 1} and 
choosing  x=3  leads to a structure {3, 2, S, 1}.  Clearly the second one always generates 
better payoffs for the firm currently making the offer, so {3, S, 1} is the equilibrium 
structure in this subgame.  Finally, taking the first subgame of the whole game, we obtain 
the Proposition. 
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